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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Obviously, there is a good deal of conflict in the decisions involving
an "order-notify" situation, but this conflict seems to arise from con-
fusion on the part of various courts. In following one of the three theories,
the courts usually rely on numerous cases dealing with similar facts but
not involving the "order-notify" situation, such as was done in the
Stoddard decision. This confusion and conflict could be readily resolved
by a clearcut decision by the United States Supreme Court, since nearly
all the cases involve a shipment in interstate commerce. Because the
United States Supreme Court has never decided the point the Massachu-
setts Supreme Court felt free in determining the matter according to its
own notions. 20 It could hardly be said that the Tri-State decision will
start a trend toward the "facts and circumstances" theory, or that the
United States Supreme Court will adopt any "duty" theory, despite the
statements of some courts. 27
It is submitted that, of the three theories, the "facts and circumstances"
theory is, perhaps, better suited to bring about substantial justice between
the parties involved in an "order-notify" situation. The rigidity and
curtness of the "absolute duty" and "no duty" rules can result in harsh
decisions in cases which, with our ever expanding and complex mercantile
structure, have a peculiar or at least singular factual background.
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF HOSPITAL RECORDS
Plaintiff sought to recover for personal injuries suffered when his
automobile collided with a truck owned by the defendant. Judgment
was for the defendant on grounds of the plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence, one facet of which was that plaintiff was driving while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor. On appeal, it was held that the
trial court did not err in its admission into evidence of hospital records
which referred to the plaintiff's alleged intoxication. The basis for
the decision was that the information as to intoxication was necessary
for proper diagnosis and treatment of the patient. Thus, the records were
admissible as "business entries" under the Connecticut Uniform Act on
26The court in the Lapp case declared: "Where the Supreme Court of the United
States has dealt with the question its decisions, of course, would be binding on this
court. But where-as is the case here-the decisions of that court furnish no guide
we are free to determine the appropriate rule to be applied, giving such consider-
ation to the decisions of lower Federal courts as we think they are entitled." Lapp
Insulator Co. v. Boston & M. R.R., 112 N.E. 2d 359, 362 (Mass., 1953).
27 The Nashville decision recognized that there was conflict in the decisions con-
cerned with the "order-notify" situation, but the Nashville court decided to follow
the "absolute duty" theory, and added: "This rule has the approval of the United
States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Georgia." Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry.
Co. v. Dreyfuss-Weil Co., 150 Ky. 333, 335, 150 S.W. 321, 322 (1912).
CASE NOTES
Business Records.' D'Amato v. Johnston, 97 A. 2d 893 (Conn., 1953).
Generally, hospital records are not admissible unless there is a statute
requiring the hospitals to keep such records. The courts ordinarily re-
quire strict adherence to the statute before admission of these records
will be allowed.2 There are several views as to admissibility, but under
today's conditions strict limitations on the use of such records would
be somewhat impractical since they might result in a denial of justice
and a burdensome expenditure of money and time.3
Some authorities favor the theory that hospital records are admissible
by virtue of statutes requiring that they be kept and made in the regular
course of business, and that their use is a permissible exception to the
hearsay rule because the records are public documents. Cases following
this line of reasoning are numerous and comparatively uniform in requir-
ing a proper foundation to be laid prior to admission of such records.
Grossman v. Delaware Electric Power Co.,4 it was held that hospital
entries made coincidentally with examination of the patient and in the
course of regular business were admissible as an exception to the hear-
say rule, upon verification by doctors making them. A proper founda-
tion for admission was deemed laid by a showing of compliance with
the statute in the making of the records. Borucki v. Mac Kenzie Bros. Co.,5
held that hospital entries or records were admissible in evidence in a
personal injury case as long as they were made in the regular course
of business and either at the time of the transaction or within a reason-
able period thereafter. These records were admissible over the objection
that they were not books of account, but merely information pertaining
to the patient, because the records were in accord, with requirements
set forth by the statute. The Rhode Island court in State v. Guaraneri6
similarly held that entries or hospital records containing details necessary
or helpful for diagnosis or care are admissible in evidence if there is
proper foundation for such admission. Specifically, the Rhode Island
court held that prior to admission of hospital records, it should be
shown that there was a positive duty to keep the record in the ordinary
course of business of the hospital, and further that the person whose
duty consisted of keeping the record was competent and, if living,
would testify to the authenticity of the records. Gearhart v. Des Moines
I Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949), § 7903.
2 32 C.J.S., Evidence § 728 (1942).
3 Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930).
4 34 Del. 521, 155 Atl. 807 (1929).
5 125 Conn. 92, 3 A. 2d 224 (1938).
6 59 R.I. 173, 194 At. 589 (1937).
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Ry. Co.,7 typifies the modem trend toward a more liberal attitude as to
admissibility of hospital records. The court held that hospital charts
could be admitted if it could be proven that they were charts regularly
used in the care and treatment of the patient. The court explained its
lack of further requirements by indicating that the well-being and
even the life of the patient depended upon the veracity of the records
and also that a party to an action is entitled to any information which may
be used effectively, especially if such information may be acquired under
circumstances which would seem to substantiate its truth.
The statute in Massachusetts providing for admissibility of hospital
records presents a somewhat different line of reasoning than that indicated
in the "regular course of business" jurisdictions. This statute states that
those hospitals which derive their support partially or in entirety through
contributions by the commonwealth or any town, inclusive of those
hospitals which give free treatment and are associated with charities,
must keep records as to treatment of cases under their care. The statute
further provides that the records shall be admissible in state courts as
evidence so far as they relate to the medical history of the case. Thus
the Massachusetts court, in Clark v. Beacon Oil Co.,8 said that a hospital
record mentioning the odor of alcohol on the breath of an automobile
driver was admissible under the statute, but except for the statute would
be considered hearsay and inadmissible as evidence. Early Massachusetts
law interpreted the statute as meaning that hospital records were admis-
sible only as relating to treatment and medical history of the patient,
but not as to evidence on liability in an action for personal injuries.9
However, this interpretation was not generally accepted and was later
modified to include personal liability evidence on the ground that
the spirit of the statute would be defeated by too strictly limiting hos-
pital records for use as evidence. 10 Hospital records may be refused
admission as evidence if the authenticity of records is not proven
satisfactorily to the court." Another ground for refusal of admission of
records is lack of proof that the hospital is supported by the common-
wealth or town or that it offers free treatment or that it is a public
charity. 12 However, a hospital is not excluded from the statute merely
because it charges those able to pay. As long as it offers some patients
treatment free of charge, it is complying with statutory requirements
7 237 Iowa 213, 21 N.W. 2d 569 (1946).
8 271 Mass. 27, 170 N.E. 836 (1930).
9 Leonard v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 234 Mass. 480, 125 N.E. 593 (1920).
10 Bibodeau v. Fitchburg, 236 Mass. 526, 128 N.E. 872 (1920).
11 Commonwealth v. Millen, 289 Mass. 441, 194 N.E. 463 (1935).
12 Karpowicz v. Manasas, 275 Mass. 413, 176 N.E. 497 (1931).
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and records of said hospital are admissible as evidence. 13 The statute
is not applicable to records only of those patients treated within walls of
a hospital, but also applies to outpatients. 14 Thus, treatment at a dispensary
or at a clinic would not disqualify records from being admissible if the case
was administered by the hospital or the patient was treated by its staff.
A very common reason for holding a chart or record inadmissible
is the lack of a proper foundation. A California court refused admission to
hospital records simply because there was no testimony to the effect
that the witness had directed that the entries be made or that he was
familiar with the handwriting on the record. 15 A Connecticut case went
so far as to hold that even though a hospital record complied with the
statute and was made in the regular course of business, it was inadmissible
because there was no affirmative finding by the trial court that the records
were made in the regular course of business.16 Records were excluded in
Hall v. Trimblel" because there was no indication of who made certain
entries and therefore the court held that the records lacked a proper
foundation. The court in May v. Szwed's indicated that lack of a proper
foundation is actually non-compliance with the controlling statute.
Some cases hold that hospital records are inadmissible because they are
protected by the privileged communication statute unless said privilege is
waived. 19 In Key v. Cosmopolitan Life, Health and Accident Insurance
Co.,20 the court stated this proposition very lucidly:
While it is true that official hospital records, properly identified, and
shown to have been kept pursuant to statutory requirements, are admissible in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, they are nevertheless subject to
an objection upon the ground of a privilege arising by virtue of the con-
fidential relationship of physician and patient.
21
The defense of privileged communication has been denied many times
where entries concerned were made by internes and others to whom the
privilege is not applicable. 22 Of course, as previously indicated, the privi-
lege may be waived.
23
13 McGaffigan v. Kennedy, 302 Mass. 12, 18 N.E. 2d 344 (1938).
14Burke v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 290 Mass. 299, 195 N.E. 507 (1935).
15 Lusardi v. Prukop, 116 Cal. App. 506, 2 P. 2d 870 (1931).
16 Veller v. Fish Transport Co., 123 Conn. 49, 192 Atl. 317 (1937).
17 104 Md. 317, 64 Atd. 1026 (1906).
18 139 Ohio 272, 39 N.E. 2d 630 (1941).
19Allen v. American Life Ins. Co., 229 Mo. App. 752, 83 S.W. 2d 192 (1935); Ver-
million v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 230 Mo. App. 993,93 S.W. 2d 45 (1936).
20232 Mo. App. 110, 102 S.W. 2d 797 (1937).
21 Ibid., at 112 and 798.
22 Shepard v. Whitney Nat. Bank of New Orleans, 177 So. 825 (La., 1938).
23 Rush v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 228 Mo. App. 60, 63 S.W. 2d 453 (1933).
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In Pennsylvania the law seems to be more strict and limited than the law
in other jurisdictions. It certainly is more definite in its requirements and
there is apparently less room for interpretation as most cases have adhered
to the statutory interpretation as set forth by the court in Paxos v. Jarka
Corp.24 An excellent statement of the law as existing in Pennsylvania is
found in Leed v. State Workmen's Ins. Fund.25
• . . if hospital records are admissible in evidence, three probative elements
must be present: (1) They must be made contemporaneously with the acts
which they purport to relate; (2) at time of making, it was impossible to
anticipate reasons which might subsequently arise for making a false entry
in the original record; or (3) the statements or entries must be made by one
possessing knowledge of their truth; and . . . where the records of a hospital
are made not by physicians admitted to practice, but by internes or students
not qualified as experts, and there is no evidence that they were made at the
direction of the physician in charge, it is error to admit the records. 20
Illinois cases uniformly hold that if hospital records are admissible at all,
they are admissible only on the same basis that ordinary books of account
are admissible and therefore require the same manner of proof for ad-
missibility. All persons who have made entries in the record must testify
as to correctness of the entries or the record will not be admissible.
2 7
All of the cases discussing the admissibility of hospital records seem to
indicate a definite trend. There is, at the present time, no dispute as to the
admissibility of these records under the proper circumstances. Of course,
there are different statutory requirements in the various jurisdictions. The
prime point, however, is that generally these records are being admitted
and serious injustices are being prevented. Even where the records are
by statute required to be kept and are by statute specifically made ad-
missible as evidence, trial counsel must be attentive to the laying of a
proper foundation for their admission.
CIVIL RIGHTS-CLASS RELIEF DENIED ALTHOUGH
CITY'S ACTS HELD DISCRIMINATORY
Kansas City, Missouri, operates a park for the amusement and recreation
of its citizens generally. Swope Park is designed to provide a well balanced
program for athletic as well as social entertainment. Among the many at-
tractions is a swimming pool. Appellant sought to be admitted to the pool
but was refused admittance in accordance with the park commissioner's
24314 Pa. 148, 171 Ad. 468 (1934).
25 128 Pa. Sup. 572, 194 Ad. 689 (1937).
26 Ibid., at 574 and 691.
27 Monahan v. Chicago Transit Authority, 341 IIl. App. 250, 93 N.E. 2d 169 (1950);
Kimber v. Kimber, 317 Il. 561, 148 N.E. 293 (1925); Wright v. Upson, 303 1l. 120,
135 N.E. 209 (1922).
